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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTICES.

XAPITEΣ Friedrich Leo zum Sechzigsten Geburtstag dargebracht.
Berlin, Weidmann'sche Buchhandlung, 1911. 490 pp. and
8 plates. 16 marks.

The criticism—and the epitaph—of the average honorary volume is fairly summed up in *laudandus tamen in partibus*, as Quintilian said of Ovid's poetry, 'good in parts', as the bashful curate said of his boiled egg. But this handsome collection of twenty-one studies by former students of Professor Leo, prefaced by a graceful dedication in Greek elegiacs, is not average in any sense. The studies all command attention, and in their range and variety reflect the versatility of the brilliant scholar for whom they were undertaken. The limitations of a single review—and of a single reviewer—naturally preclude an adequate discussion of all the material presented. I must, therefore, content myself with an occasional comment while surveying the work rapidly as a whole.

Hermann Schultz's article, *Die Georgica in Vergils Stilentwicklung* (pp. 359–370), deserves more than the passing mention I am giving it here, especially as I am not altogether in sympathy with this type of investigation. Kurt Stavenhagen (8–44) works out at length the development of Plato in his theory of Ideas. Textual criticism and interpretation of Menander are well represented by W. Vollgraff's *Menandrea* (55–75) and K. F. W. Schmidt's article (45–54) on the *Περικειρομένη*, lines 81–104. H. Sjögren (279–296) takes up some of the many difficulties in the text of Cicero's letters to Atticus, and T. Bögel (297–321) discusses the second and third books of the *De Legibus* from the point of view of their composition and style. Hans Wegehaupt (146–169) gives the text of Plutarch's *Πότερον ὕδαρ ἢ πῦρ χρησιμώτερον*, accompanied by a complete apparatus criticus and a description of the thirty-five manuscripts. Kurt Hubert (170–187) makes a careful examination of the *Συμποσιακά Προβλήματα*, and finds that this work is purely a literary fiction, although an air of reality is imparted by making some of the interlocutors actual persons, etc. This, in fact, is quite in harmony with the conventions of the antique dialogue. H. Hobein (188–219), editor of the recent Teubner text of Maximus Tyrius, considers the object and significance of the first dissertation. G. Jachmann (249–278) takes up the question of *contaminatio* in the *Poenulus* of Plautus and examines the composition of the play in detail. W. Capelle (220–248) passes in review the references of Olympio-

doros to 'Alexander' — a matter more or less confused by Ideler — and concludes that the author of our extant commentary on the *Meteorologica* of Aristotle was Alexander Aphrodisiensis. H. Jacobson (407-452) has a long article on the formation of nominal stems in Latin and Indo-European. G. Pasquali (113-122) explains and justifies the prooemium of Aratos. W. Crönert (123-145) devotes his attention to Lobon. His article is a very valuable contribution to our knowledge of the troublesome activity of that Tzetzes of the Alexandrian age. Archaeology and epigraphy are represented by Erich Ziebarth (395-406), *Der Eid vom Kloster Lorch*, P. Jacobsthal (452-465), *Zur Kunstgeschichte der griechischen Inschriften*, and Leo Weber (466-490), *Zur Münzprägung der phrygischen Hierapolis*.

Some years ago Professor Leo himself examined the question whether there was such a thing as subjective elegy in the Alexandrian period and made a strong plea for the affirmative. Since then the matter has not been allowed to rest for any length of time. Jacoby's counterblast for the negative has not been neglected — especially, by his opponents. Undoubtedly he is at his best in this particular discussion, and it would be unfair to minimize the fact that he has done a real service. Nevertheless, I cannot escape the conviction that even here his lucubrations have done quite as much to obscure and agitate as to clarify and settle. The fault lies largely with his own methods as an investigator and reasoner. The occasionally reckless way, for example, in which he mingles argument with mere assertion, his habit of arguing and then assuming, makes the reader chary of accepting any statement, any conclusion the validity of which is derived from sound logical deduction. What Wheeler (cf. *Class. Phil.*, 6, 56f.) has to say — a sane conservative scholar as well as a thorough and conscientious investigator — is much more to the point and much more convincing. Of course, the question is ultimately a matter of probabilities, not of definite ascertainable facts. But, so far as they go, the probabilities are largely in favour of Professor Leo. This is clearly indicated by Max Pohlenz in an excellent article (76-112) which he entitles, *Die Hellenistische Poesie und Philosophie*.

He sketches first of all the sweeping changes which came to Greek life and thought with the Alexandrian age, more especially, as regards the functions, the importance, and the relative position of philosophy and poetry. The great Ionian philosophers had been scholars and investigators, and their chief concern had been *τὰ φυσικά*, 'Natural Philosophy', as it used to be called in the old college catalogues. Contemporary poetry concerned itself with the problems and results of human experience, and this sphere always remained especially characteristic of poetry. Those days and those men had passed away, and philosophy was largely concerned with other matters and

followed different methods. But even long afterwards, in the Graeco-Roman period, when philosophy and poetry have so many topics in common, it is always philosophy, not poetry, that was the original borrower. This distinction between the two departments was never forgotten. Pohlenz makes this point tolerably clear, and, as we shall see, it has an important bearing upon a later phase of his investigation. In the Alexandrian period philosophy had not only changed in scope but in relative position. For the average man it was far less important than it had once been. The age was cultivated, over-cultivated, if you please. At any rate, the time had come, as sooner or later it always does come, when men had begun to stagger under the burden of their own accumulated devices. The situation then as now brings with it the realization that wealth and power and fame, the conventional prizes of human endeavour, are not worth the price that is exacted for them. After all, the problem of life is happiness and peace, and for the solution of that problem the Alexandrian age turned from philosophy to poetry. The ideal life of the irrevocable past, the Golden Age, was a poetic theme as old as Hesiod; the best and most obvious substitute for it in contemporary existence was the ideal simple life far from the madding crowd. And contemporary poets began more and more to mould and elaborate the poetical tradition of this and similar themes. We may be sure that the *Thalysia* of Theokritos was not the first poem in which the ideal life was treated from the subjective point of view. We cannot prove it definitely, but the chances are, as Pohlenz tries to show, that the type of elegy represented by Tibullus was already in existence. Mimnermos, to cite a single instance within the elegy itself, was subjective to the point of polemic. Certainly, too, Hermesianax speaks to Leontion quite as did Theognis to Kyrnos. Thanks to Peripatetic influence Kallimachos was deliberately objective, but the influence of Kallimachos, large as it is, is not large enough to cover the entire Alexandrian age. It is true, too, that our few surviving references to Hellenistic elegy point to the objective types, but this cannot be made to prove anything more than that the later authors to whom we owe these references generally had practical reasons for choosing this sphere—such as noting a particular version of some story, or the like.

True, the *Thalysia* of Theokritos contains only the subjective-idyllic. The erotic is lacking. But Mimnermos was the father of the erotic elegy, and next to the idyllic the most characteristic motive of Alexandrian literature is the erotic. It is useless to insist that the subjective-erotic of Mimnermos passed into the erotic epigram. At best, this is a mere assertion. And what becomes of it if we agree with Reitzenstein, as undoubtedly we must, that even in the Alexandrian period there was no hard and fast line between elegy and the epigram in distichs. Even the idyllic cannot be categorically denied to Mimnermos

Thanks to his social position and his consequent attitude towards life he stands apart from all the earlier elegiac poets and has much in common with the average literary man of the Alexandrian age. Indeed, the fleeting glimpse of his life and the themes of his poetry which we get from three distichs of Hermesianax (Athen. 597 f.) :

Μίμνερμος δὲ τὸν ἥδ' ὅς εὗρετο πολλὸν ἀνατλάς
ἤχον καὶ μαλακοῦ πνεῦμ' ἀπὸ πενταμέτρον,
καίετο μὲν Ναννοῦς· πολὺ δ' ἐπὶ πολλάκι λωτῶ
κηρωθεὶς κώμους εἶχε σὺν Ἑξαμύρῃ,
ἦ δ' ἡχθεεῖ¹ Ἑρμόβιον τὸν αἰεὶ βαρὺν ἥδ' Φερεκλῆν
ἐχθρὸν μισήσας οἱ ἀνέπεμψεν ἔπη.

A sore heart taught Mimnermos the haunting, sweet refrain,
The sigh, of soft pentameters—the echo of his pain!
At revels with Hexamyes he breathed in mournful mood
His burning love for Nanno, so often vainly wooed.
Again, he fixed his rivals—Hermobios hated worse
Than Pherekles was hated—with bitter shafts of verse—

is curiously suggestive of Propertius as well as of Catullus.

The chances are then, as we already see, that Hellenistic poetry, which felt itself quite the equal of philosophy, found a form fitted for the direct expression of its subjective feelings and views of life.

Much the same story is told if we work backward from the Roman elegy. We have been assured, for instance, that such characteristic topics of the Roman elegy as the idyllic simple life, the complaint of luxury and extravagance, the horror of war, navigation, and similar short cuts to an untimely death, all come directly or indirectly from the diatribes of the philosophers. Obviously this statement has no cogency unless it can be proved that the discussion of these topics began with the philosophers. This cannot be proved. On the contrary, if Pohlenz is correct, this material, as we have already seen, originated with the poets, and wherever philosophy and poetry deal with the same topics the ultimate debtor is always philosophy, not poetry.

The main lines of Pohlenz' discussion in this section of his investigation appear to have been inspired by the well-known article in which Jacoby assists at the birth of the first elegy of Tibullus and describes the entire process—a matter upon which it is sufficiently obvious that neither he nor any other man except the poet himself and during his own lifetime has ever been a competent authority.

It will be remembered that, according to Jacoby, one of the models of this elegy was the second Epode of Horace. Now, of

¹ The passage is corrupt, although the general sense is sufficiently clear. Wilamowitz suggests ἡρεθε δ'.

course, no one would dream of denying that Tibullus must have known the second Epode of Horace; for the sake of argument we might even grant that the first elegy of Tibullus indicates that he knew it. But neither has any bearing necessarily on Jacoby's statement that the one served as a model for the other. As the question now stands Jacoby's statement is of no value unless he can show, first of all, that Tibullus never wrote an elegy unless he had a definite model before him. Jacoby assumes this, but the assumption receives no support from any evidence now at our command. Indeed, of all the Roman poets, no one gives so little indication of the use of specific models now existing as does Tibullus. Granting, however, for the sake of argument that Jacoby has proved this assumption, he must then prove that the model in this particular case was the second Epode of Horace. This cannot be done unless it can be shown with reasonable certainty that, so far as Tibullus was concerned, the second Epode was the only available poem dealing subjectively with the idyllic simple life. Now, this is certainly not the case. The *Thalysia* of Theokritos is proof to the contrary. More than that, the *Thalysia* also shows that we cannot dodge the issue by making the conveniently indefinite Gallus responsible for the development of this topic in poetry. And Horace himself really tells the same story. The second Epode, with its sudden surprise at the end, would have been a failure unless the subject with which it deals had been a well-worn theme to contemporary readers as well as to ourselves. In short, the second Epode is in reality a parody. As such, it presupposes not only a familiar but a serious theme. Now, the theme, as Heinze remarks, is distinctly elegiac. The poem itself, except for the end, might have been an elegy. It is the end that explains and, one might say, necessitates the iambic form. In other words, the second Epode of Horace not only presupposes serious poems on the same theme, but poems, certainly elegiac in tone and manner, presumably, therefore, elegiac in form. If so, it is fair to suspect that the erotic element was not absent. The fact that Theokritos did not use the distich for his *Thalysia* and that the erotic motive does not appear in it is no proof that the type of elegy represented by Tibullus and among surviving authors by Tibullus alone, was not already in existence. The same proof, for instance, applied to the *Ἡλακάτη* would show that the epigram with presents was post-Theocritean. But Maass has shown that this was not the case.

The plea of Pohlenz for Philitas as the inventor of the Tibullian type of elegy is not so successful. He does point out, however, that all our testimony, as far as it goes, is to the effect that both by temperament and career Philitas had a decided bias for the psychological and subjective. Of course, the Bittis would have settled all this protracted dispute at once. But

there are no fragments of this work. In fact, practically all that we know of it is to be gathered from two distichs of Hermesianax (Athen. 598 f.) which I subjoin here for the convenience of the reader:

οἶσθα δὲ καὶ τὸν αἰοιδόν, ὃν Εἰρυνπίλον πολιῆται
 Κῶροι χάλκειον θῆκαν ὑπὸ πλατάνῳ
 Βιττίδα μολπάζοντα θοόν, περὶ πάντα Φιλίταν
 ῥήματα καὶ πᾶσαν τρυνόμενον λαλίην.

It will be seen that the poet here is unusually unsatisfactory, even for him. Nor is the situation satisfactorily explained by Pohlenz. He thinks that the bronze set up by the Coans represented the poet singing to 'the nimble' Bittis under a plane tree, and that the group, so to speak, was suggested by a famous passage in the book itself. I am not so sure that this is justified by the text of Hermesianax. On the other hand, this interpretation of Pohlenz does not altogether deserve such cavalier criticism as that which is accorded it by Wilamowitz in his 'Minnermos und Properz'. However that may be, Bittis was the beloved of the poet: we see this from Hermesianax himself and more clearly still from Ovid, *Tristia*, i, 6, 1:

Nec tantum Clario Lyde dilecta poetae,
 nec tantum Coe Bittis amata suo est,
 pectoribus quantum tu nostris, uxor, inhaeres,
 digna minus misero, non meliore viro—

from which Pohlenz suspects that Bittis was the wife of Philitas. And what Hermesianax has to say of the Lyde of Antimachos (41-46) as compared with what he says here of Philitas is enough to show that the Bittis was not an *ἐπικήδειον*. The girl was still alive when her lover sang to her or about her. It is also to be observed that Philitas occupies a place apart from either Minnermos or Antimachos in the catalogue of Hermesianax. This indicates, according to Pohlenz, that Philitas was accounted the inventor of a specific type of elegy. If so, the process of exclusion might be invoked to strengthen our suspicion that that type was the one with which we are concerned.

However that may be, the only really logical position with regard to this question, it seems to me, is the one which Pohlenz has taken. The question ultimately, as was noted above, is one of probabilities, not of ascertainable facts. The statement, therefore, that there was no such thing as the Tibullian type of elegy in the Alexandrian age is unwarranted by the premises. A categorical statement cannot be derived from probabilities. What Pohlenz has shown—and here he is quite within his rights—is that, all things considered, it is most unlikely that in the Hellenistic period of all others, there was no such thing as a subjective elegy of the idyllic-erotic type, no elegy, so to speak, in which love in a cottage was described by one of the prospective tenants.

One of the most interesting articles in our volume is R. Bürger's *Beiträge zur Elegancia Tibullus* (371-394). His thesis is, in brief, that Tibullus was literally a Caesar in verse, in other words, that he belonged as did Caesar to the Analogists, a school which as early even as the beginning of the Augustan age was already passing out of fashion. Plessis had already had an inkling of the truth in a general way. In his *Histoire de la Poésie Latine* (see A. J. P. XXX 447) he observes that Tibullus in taste if not in fact belonged to the Attic type.

Bürger undoubtedly proves his thesis, but here as elsewhere, his deductions are not always warranted. The result is that his examples are sometimes more convincing than the conclusions he draws from them or than the purposes to which he applies them. For the present, however, I omit any discussion of these and similar matters, as Bürger himself states that only a portion of his investigation is presented.

At the same time, inasmuch as Bürger himself makes no reference to it, I may remark in passing that his discussion is an interesting commentary on one of Jacoby's recent pronouncements, the substance of which is that Tibullus was not a success as an amatory poet and that the reason was because he was incapable of strong feeling. What constitutes a successful amatory poet? And is it true that Tibullus was not a successful amatory poet? And even if we grant that he was not a successful amatory poet what shall we say of the alleged reason—except that it really rests ultimately on the naive assumption that poets express all that they feel and that strength of feeling is measured only by superlatives. Shall we make no allowance for Tibullus' possible reserve as a gentleman and a man of the world, not to mention the fact that the first and most important article of his literary creed is the reserve and simplicity of the classical *μηδὲν ἄγαν*? Such criticism forces one to suspect that its author still has much to learn in the field of literary art. The suspicion is strengthened when we find that he terms Quintilian one of those rhetors whom 'jede Fähigkeit mangelt über die Komposition eines Kunstwerks zu urteilen, weil ihr eigenes Schaffen sich ganz auf die Ausgestaltung der Einzelheiten erstreckt' (Rhein. Mus. 65, 79—cp. 86, 'das Urteil an sich und für uns nicht kompetenter antiker Kritiker'). Rothstein holds the same view (Einleit. Prop., p. xlvii) and, doubtless, there are some others. But this is no help to Jacoby—and no harm to Quintilian.

Kurt Münschner (322-358) subjects Cicero's *Orator*, 140 ff., the famous passage in which the great master of Latin prose rhythm undertakes to set forth the principles of his art, to a rigid cross-examination. His purpose is to exhibit the author's scheme of composition and arrangement but, more especially, to discover his sources and to trace and tabulate the influence of

each. His results are summarized on pp. 356-358 of his article. If they were presented pictorially they would make the Orator, 140 ff. look like a sample-page of Professor Haupt's Polychrome Bible. If Münschner is correct—and presumably he is correct in the main—this account of prose rhythm is a thing of shreds and patches, a Joseph's coat of many colours, here and there interspersed with homespun. The lessons of personal experience and the more or less contradictory statements of various Greek theorists, in some cases of opposing schools, are jumbled together in such a way as to indicate that the compiler never went far enough with his task to harmonize his colours and to produce a logical and intelligible whole.

Here Münschner rests his case. But the secondary results of such an investigation are often as interesting as the purpose for which it was originally undertaken. Quite incidentally, for example, this inquiry throws another illuminating sidelight upon Cicero's methods as a scholar. We knew he was hasty and not altogether thorough, but for anyone, above all for investigators, for those who know by experience the true inwardness of such a piece of patchwork, Münschner's results are a revelation.

Of course, a great artist is not necessarily a great teacher nor even a tolerable teacher, and, in any case, nothing is so difficult to teach others as that which for the teacher himself has become a second nature. It is beyond question, however, that Cicero was, in reality, quite capable of giving a definite idea of his art, and it is equally certain that the best method for him to adopt would have been to confine himself strictly to the one greatest living authority on the subject. But it is characteristic of him—and, to a certain extent, of his times—that he should choose instead to indite an account which, to take a hint from old Coryat, is strongly suggestive of 'Crudities hastily gobbled up in five days travells' in the 'literature' of prose rhythm as taught in the leading Greek universities. We see now more plainly than ever why it was that Cicero himself was never quite clear with regard to his own theory. This was one of the by-products of Zielinski's great investigation ten years ago (see A. J. P. XXV 453-463), and, thanks to Münschner, we are now more than ever convinced that the secret of Cicero's prose rhythm must be learned, if learned at all, from Cicero's practice, not from Cicero's theory.

Our volume opens (1-7) with a short but sympathetic and convincing study by Ewald Bruhn. His theme is the contradictory reports of Xenophon and Plato regarding the character of Menon. According to Xenophon he was a besotted fool, if not actually a knave and a traitor. According to Plato he was merely a young man with considerable vanity—natural enough, in view of his good looks, position and popularity—a vivid mind, an enthusiasm for the new rhetoric which sometimes led him to argue just for the pleasure of it, and an impatience of more or less pompous conven-

tionalities which occasionally spurred him on to express views not to be taken seriously. In short, he was one of those persons who for various reasons like to stand on their heads, so to speak, and insist that the rest of the world is wrong side up. All which did him no harm so far as Socrates was concerned—a humorous and a sympathetic soul, as well as a wonderful judge of men. But Xenophon—and unfortunately for Menon Xenophon was often standing by at the time—was not a sympathetic soul. He was a conventional soul and, therefore, easily shocked, especially when he desired it—and in this particular case it is not improbable that he did desire it. At any rate, it is worthy of note that he admired Klearchos almost as extravagantly as Klearchos detested Menon. Then, too, the ‘Attic Bee’—like the plain honey bee, and bees in general—had no keen sense of humour. And, thanks to our pedagogical traditions, the ‘Attic Bee’ has been buzzing in our ears ever since Menon was paradoxical for the sake of remaining in the lime-light.

Of course, all this has been hard on the poor fellow and we sympathize with him. But his fate ought to warn us never to be anything but absolutely literal and truthful in public. At that very moment some one may be lurking among our auditors who is preparing a book with us in it, a book for the use of school children two thousand years hence. As one of Menon’s own distant connections has said, ‘You never can tell!’

KIRBY FLOWER SMITH.

The Oxford English Dictionary: See—Senatory (Volume VIII).

By HENRY BRADLEY. Th—Thyzle (Volume IX). By

Sir JAMES A. H. MURRAY. Sleep—Sniggle (Volume IX).

By W. A. CRAIGIE. Senatory—Several (Volume VIII).

By HENRY BRADLEY. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1912.

The past year has seen published four more quarterly Parts of the Oxford Dictionary, containing volumes VIII and IX, as above. The Part issued on January 2, 1912, begins with the noun *See*, seat, chiefly used of a bishop’s *See*, which fills a column and a half. This is followed by the common verb *See*, OE. *sēon* (*seah*, *sāwon* and *sāgon*, *ge-sewen*), which, with its phraseological combinations, fills over fifteen columns, with examples from *Béowulf* on. ‘Three distinct Indogermanic roots of the form **segu* are commonly recognized.’ The form used in gambling, as in poker, is duly registered; see quotations dated 1885,